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Ethics, Morality, and Professional Responsibility 
Dallin H. Oaks* 
We are not here to start a law school but to recognize the 
maturity of one that has come of age with the arrival of its third 
class, the assembling of most of its faculty, and the completion 
of its magificent quarters. It is therefore unnecessary to review the 
formal charges given to the law school faculty and students two 
years ago at  the ceremony commemorating the 0pening.l Rather, 
these remarks will add one additional charge, which concerns the 
J. Reuben Clark Law School's special challenges and opportuni- 
ties for leadership in teaching ethics, morality, and professional 
responsibility. 
During my first month of law studies a t  the University of 
Chicago, 21 years ago this fall, Professor Karl N. Llewellyn intro- 
duced us to Carl Sandburg's poem, "The Lawyers Know Too 
Much." I share it with you now because it provides a suitable 
introduction for my subject. 
"The lawyers, Bob, know too much. 
They are chums of the books of old John Marshall. 
They know it all, what a dead hand wrote, 
A stiff dead hand and its knuckles crumbling, 
The bones of the fingers a thin white ash. 
The lawyers know 
a dead man's thoughts too well. 
"In the heels of the higgling lawyers, Bob 
Too many slippery ifs and buts and howevers, 
Too much hereinbefore provided whereas, 
Too many doors to go in and out of. 
"When the lawyers are through 
What is there left, Bob? 
Can a mouse nibble at  it 
And find enough to fasten a tooth in? 
"Why is there always a secret singing 
When a lawyer cashes in? 
Why does a hearse horse snicker 
Hauling a lawyer away? 
*President, Brigham Young University. The research assistance of Ted D. Lewis is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
1. Copies of the addresses delivered at the ceremony of August 27, 1973 opening the 
J. Reliben Clark Law School are available on request from the Office of the Dean. 
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"The work of a bricklayer goes to the blue. 
The knack of a mason outlasts a moon. 
The hands of a plasterer hold a room together, 
The land of a farmer wishes him back again. 
Singers of songs and dreamers of plays 
Build a house no wind blows over. 
The lawyers-tell me why a hearse horse snickers 
hauling a lawyer's bones. "2 
Despite unprecedented demand for admission to law schools 
and an unequaled record of public leadership and service by grad- 
uates of law schools, the legal profession is still the subject of 
widespread public misunderstanding and mistrust. For example, 
a recent nationwide survey of adults in all income groups, con- 
ducted by the American Bar Association Special Committee to 
Survey Legal Needs, of which I am a member, shows that more 
than one-third of our fellow Americans believe that most lawyers 
would engage in unethical or illegal activities to help a client in 
an important case, and that more than one-third also believe that 
lawyers are not concerned about doing anything with "the bad 
apples" in the legal profe~sion.~ Happily, seven out of eight of 
those who had personally used legal services gave their own law- 
yer high marks for his honesty in dealing with them.4 In the same 
survey, persons were asked to identify the personal qualities of 
greatest importance in their decision whether or not to retain a 
particular lawyer. The qualities of greatest importance to this 
decision were the lawyer's general reputation and his ethical stan- 
dards, including honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness. The 
number of persons who mentioned these qualities was three times 
the number who mentioned c~mpetence .~  
While a significant segment of the public persists in its tradi- 
tional suspicion of the bar, the legal profession haggles over who 
is to blame. The organized bar criticizes the law schools for failing 
to be more effective in teaching professional responsibility, while 
legal scholars charge the organized bar with failing to be effective 
in professional discipline. In an atmosphere of heightened con- 
cern about the ethical standards of the legal profession, we re- 
main unsure of our remedies. 
2. Sandburg, The Lawyer Knows Too Much, quoted in K .  Llewellyn, The Bramble 
Bush 142 (1951). 
3. Curran & Spalding, The Legal Needs of the Public, ABA SPECIAL COMM. TO SURVEY 
LEGAL NEEDS 94, 96 (Prelim. Report 1974). 
4. ABA Special Comm. to Survey Legal Needs, Responses to Questionnaire, Part IV, 
Question 40. 
5. Id. Part V, Questions 4 & 5. 
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Retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, a leader in the 
move for higher standards at the bar, has declared that "law 
schools must consciously undertake the one task that they have 
universally rejected: instilling normative values in their stu- 
dents." Explaining the increasing importance of teaching honesty 
and integrity in law schools, he observes that the influences of 
church and family, which formerly developed these virtures, 
"have drastically diminished in importance in this country, and 
no other force has arisen to take their place? 
In contrast, Dean Albert M. Sacks of the Harvard Law 
School is quoted as giving his opinion that the law schools do not 
have any clear sense of how to teach legal ethics.' Voicing a com- 
mon opinion of legal educators, UCLA Law Dean Murray L. 
Schwartz argues that formal legal education is not likely to con- 
tribute much to the moral and ethical development of law stu- 
dents because their notions of ethics and morality are established 
before they arrive at law school and because law schools are not 
organized or conducted to inculcate such standards in any case? 
This is because the law teacher is typically theoretical, skeptical, 
scholarly, and remote from his students, and all of these charac- 
teristics inhibit instruction in ethics and morality. 
The promotion of moral and ethical concerns among law stu- 
dents is apparently no more effective in church-related institu- 
tions. In the words of Dean Thomas L. Shaffer of Notre Dame 
Law School, "most of the law faculties a t  what were once thought 
to be the great Protestant Christian universities appear uninter- 
ested in their institutional heritage, if not ashamed of it," and 
"[llaw faculties in Roman Catholic universities have rarely 
passed beyond fruitless phrases about natural law, which long ago 
became a banner rather than an idea, and is now neither banner 
nor idea. 
Former Stanford Dean Bayless Manning agrees that law 
schools cannot teach a student to become an  ethical human 
being. He points the finger a t  the organized bar, charging that "if 
the bar's disciplinary standards were clear and stringent and en- 
6. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 252-53 (1975). 
7 .  Brooks, The President's Page, 18 BOSTON B.J. 3,  6 (1974), quoted in Manning, A 
Socio-Ethical Foundation for Meeting the Obligations of the Legal Profession, 5 
CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV. 237, 238 (1974). 
8 .  Schwartz, Legal Ethics u. Common Notions of Morality, LEARNING AND THE LAW 
40'47-48 (Spring 1975); see also Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 261, 265-66, 273-74 (1975). 
9 .  Shaffer, Christian Theories of Rofessional Responsibility, 48 S .  CAL. L. REV. 721- 
22 (1975). 
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forcement an ever-present reality, the law schools could and 
would drive home to their students that it is a condition of being 
in the profession that the lawyer be not only a noncriminal but 
an exemplar of lawful conduct . . . . [which would be] the kind 
of moral and legal leadership the public is entitled to expect from 
. . . officers of the court."1° 
Our two honored judicial guests and honorary degree recipi- 
ents have both been leaders in trying to raise the ethical stan- 
dards of the bar. For example; during his term as President of the 
American Bar Association, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. made 
professional ethics a major area of emphasis, launching an ambi- 
tious program that was to culminate in a full review of the old 
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics." Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger has repeatedly used the weight of his high office, such as 
in his remarks this morning12 and in his influential annual ad- 
dresses on the "State of the Judiciary," to call for and point the 
way toward increased attention to ethical questions by law 
schools and to professional discipline by the organized bad3  
As a consequence of these efforts and others, we are in a time 
when ethics, morality, and professional responsibility are among 
the most important concerns of the legal profession, including 
practitioners, teachers, and the judiciary. 
There are also stirrings of concern about the deeper values 
from which we obtain our commitments to law, morality, ethics, 
and professional responsibility. In his recent book, The Interac- 
tion of Law and Religion, Professor Harold J. Berman of the 
Harvard Law School comments on the "integrity crisis" of West- 
ern society, observing that "[o]ur whole culture seems to be 
facing the possibility of a kind of nervous breakdown."14 The 
major symptom of this threatened breakdown is the apparent 
widespread loss of confidence in our two most basic institutions, 
law and religion. He finds one cause of the current disillusion- 
ment in "the too radical separation of onefrom the other."15 Law 
helps to give society its cohesive structure, but it  is religion that 
10. Manning, If Lawyers Were Angels: A Sermon in One Canon, 60 A.B.A.J. 821,823 
(1974); see genemlly Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self- 
Regulation? 1974 U .  ILL. L.F. 193. 
11. Powell, The President's Annual Address: The State of the Legal Bofession, 51 
A.B.A.J. 821, 825 (1965). 
12. Burger, The Role of the Lawyer in Modem Society, supra this issue. 
13. Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1975,61 A.B.A.J. 439,440-41 (1975); see also 
Burger, The Future of Legal Education, 15 STUDENT LAWYER J. 18 (1970). 
14. H .  BERMAN, THE INTERACTION F LAW AND RELIGION 21 (1974). 
15. Id. at 23. 
5911 LEGAL ETHICS 595 
gives life and emotional attachment to that structure. In the 
forthcoming and final book of their Story of Civilization series, 
Will and Ariel Durant observe that "the Twentieth Century ap- 
proaches its end without having yet found a natural substitute for 
religion in persuading the human animal to morality."16 Berman 
says that the secularists and rationalists, who rely on an intellec- 
tual commitment to law, have drained law of its emotional vital- 
ity because their utilitarian ethic cannot sustain public support 
for the law. The emotion that ties us to the law is our belief in 
its "inherent and ultimate rightness," a belief fostered most effec- 
tively by religion. Consequently, Professor Berman concludes 
that "law and religion stand or fall together; and if we wish law 
to stand, we shall have to give new life to the essentially religious 
commitments that give it its ritual, its tradition, and its authority 
. . . .  
" 17 
To me there is a close relationship between the weakening of 
religious faith and commitment to transcendent values on the one 
hand, and on the other, the legal profession's current and intense 
preoccupation with legal rights and procedures, which sometimes 
seems to hamper our view and pursuit of the ultimate goals of 
truth and justice. As religious commitments weaken, we are more 
likely to have our attention diverted from ultimate values to oth- 
ers merely implementary. 
While serving as a law clerk for the late Chief Justice Earl 
Warren of the United States Supreme Court, I read hundreds of 
handwritten petitions in which persons convicted of crimes 
sought relief from the Nation's highest court. I was struck with 
the fact that these prisoners rarely asserted their innocence. 
While understanding the reasons why an appellate court must 
focus on the procedural fairness of the trial and does not ordinar- 
ily review the question of guilt or innocence, I was nevertheless 
amazed that nonlawyers convicted of crimes realize so soon that 
once they are convicted at  trial, our criminal justice system fo- 
cuses on procedure, treating the fact of their guilt or innocence 
as almost entirely beside the point. The preoccupation with pro- 
cedure is coming to be predominant, even in the trial court. Jus- 
tice Walter V. Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court is only one 
of many astute judges who has complained that 
[Allmost never do we have a genuine issue of guilt or innocence 
today. The system has so changed that what we are doing in the 
16. Merry, The Age of the Durants, the National Observer, Aug. 2, 1975, at 20, 
col. 1. 
17. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 24-25, 36-37. 
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courtroom is trying the conduct of the police and that of the 
prosecutor all along the line. Has there been a misstep a t  this 
point? a t  that point? You know very well that the man is guilty; 
there is no doubt about the proof. But you must ask, for exam- 
ple: Was there something technically wrong with the arrest? 
You're always trying something irrelevant. The case is deter- 
mined on something that really hasn't anything to do with guilt 
or innoccence. l8 
The operation of the exclusionary rule, which I have criticized 
elsewhere, l9 provides another example. 
Some of you will be saying, "But our procedural guarantees 
are designed to serve the ends of truth and to protect personal 
rights of fundamental importance to truth and justice." I agree. 
I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoc- 
cupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our proce- 
dures are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are 
truth and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends. 
When we lose sight of this relationship, then some procedures can 
cease to serve their designed objectives. In the long run that result 
will discredit law and the legal profession. "Too many slippery ifs 
and buts and howevers," Sandburg says, "[tloo many doors to 
go in and out of. . . . Why does a hearse horse snicker [hlauling 
a lawyer away?" 
Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
from these goals. It is surely past time for serious consideration 
of the recent American Assembly charge that 
Too often our adversary techniques conceal or distort the truth 
rather than promote its discovery. The legal profession should 
consider and explore appropriate modifications of adversary 
procedures for the purpose of better determining the truth, and 
should formulate ethical prescriptions embracing a higher pro- 
fessional duty to seek the truth.*O 
Judge Marvin E. Frankel developed this point brilliantly in 
"The Search for Truth," his recent Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture 
before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. La- 
18. Schaefer, A Center ReportlCrimiml Justice, THE CENTER MAGAZINE 69, 76 (Nov. 
1968), quoted in M. Frankel, The Search for Truth-An Umpireal View, 31st Annual 
Benjamin Cardozo Lecture to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Dec. 
16, 1974, at 13-14. 
19. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 
665 (1970). 
20. THE AMERICAN SSEMBLY, LAW AND A CHANGING SOCIETY 12 (1975). 
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menting the fact that the adversary process "often achieves truth 
only as a convenience, a by-product, or an accidental approxima- 
tion," Judge Frankel observes that "our relatively low regard for 
truth-seeking is perhaps the chief reason for the dubious esteem 
in which the legal profession is held."21 And the point reaches 
beyond reputation to reality. Judge Frankel suggests that we are 
not likely to promote high moral standards in a dispute-resolving 
system that focuses on something other than truth: "In a system 
that so values winning and deplores losing, where lawyers are 
trained to fight for, not to judge, their clients, where we learn as 
advocates not to 'know' inconvenient things, moral elegance is 
not to be expected."22 
To cite a related deficiency, as a profession we are preoccu- 
pied with rights and, as Elliot Richardson noted a few years ago, 
"have increasingly and unceremoniously ignored the subject of 
obligations. At no time in history have we ever been more defi- 
cient in our sense of obligation than we are today. The hoary and 
hallowed indebtedness of a person to family, to tribe, to customs 
and gods, seems to have slipped away like a guest a t  a much too 
crowded party."23 The history of the American Bar Association's 
Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities provides an 
illustration. The word "responsibilities" was added to the title of 
that section by some farsighted persons who foresaw what might 
happen but were unable by that measure to prevent it. As a 
member of that section from the time of its founding, I have seen 
i t  concentrate almost exclusively upon the subject of rights. This 
is the legal profession's instinctive thrust. In relation to rights, we 
appear as gladiators, guarantors, and enforcers. On the subject of 
- responsibilities, the law is a schoolmaster and the legal profession 
its faculty. And who would not prefer the role of champion of 
rights rather than preacher of responsibilities? Clients conven- 
tionally retain lawyers to secure an advantage under the adver- 
sary system, not to receive a lecture on their own deficiencies and 
their advocate's higher loyalties to the law. "Perhaps obligations 
took their quiet departure in the face of the rampant relativism 
of the day," Elliot Richardson suggests. "A sense of obligation 
implies, after all, a knowledge of right and wrong, and this in turn 
implies standards on which a society agrees."24 
So what, if anything, can the law schools do? 
21. M. Frankel, supra note 18, at 12-19. 
22. Id. at 40. 
23. Richardson, On Behalf of Obligations, 8 LINCOLN L. REV. 109 (1973). 
24. Id. at 110. 
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Responsibilities of both lawyers and clients should be no 
stranger to the law school curriculum. Law schools can surely 
sensitize their students to professional problems by identifying 
and clarifying issues of legal ethics, a conventional and well rec- 
ognized technique of law teaching.25 To fail in this minimal role 
is to leave law students to infer that value judgments are not a 
significant part of a lawyer's function.26 Law faculties must at 
least overcome their traditional lack of interest in moral, ethical, 
and professional problems. Conscientious and articulate disa- 
greement among different law teachers on a particular moral and 
ethical issue is surely preferable to implied pretensions of unan- 
imity that students will disbelieve and read as judgments of indif- 
ference on matters of ethics and morality. 
But law schools can do-more than this, and the J. Reuben 
Clark Law School has the most promising ideals and circum- 
stances to be a leader in this important area. Notre Dame Dean 
Thomas L. Shaffer has noted sadly that "Christianity has had too 
little to do with what is hopeful in the American legal profession. 
I believe that a motivating reason for that failure is our diffidence 
in talking about religious commitment; when few talk about reli- 
gion, personal value is inaccessible and public style becomes irre- 
ligious. Too many candles are under too many bushels."27 
We have no diffidence in talking about religious commitment 
a t  Brigham Young University, and we will have none in the J. 
Reuben Clark Law School. Religious commitment, religious val- 
ues, and concern with ethics and morality are part of the reason 
for this school's existence, and will be in the atmosphere of its 
study. As President Marion G. Rornney," our third honorary de- 
gree recipient, noted in our opening ceremonies, this law school 
was established to provide an institution in which students could 
"obtain a knowledge of the laws of man in the light of the laws 
of God," and the trustees would like this school to reflect the aura 
of President J. Reuben Clark: "faith, virtue, integrity, industry, 
scholarship, and patrioti~m."~~ 
If it is true that law students cannot be taught ethics and 
morality in law school because those value commitments are 
25. Weckstein, supra note 8, at 274. 
26. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 50. 
27. Shaffer, supra note 9, at 722. 
28. Second Counselor in the First Presidency of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter- 
day Saints and Second Vice President of the Board of Trustees of Brigham Young Univer- 
sity. 
29. Addresses at t.he Ceremony Opening the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Aug. 27, 
1973, at 20-22. 
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fixed before they enroll, then that fact, an excuse for other law 
schools, becomes a unique opportunity for this one. Most of the 
students and faculty a t  this law school are rooted in the same 
religious tradition, and that tradition more than any other fact 
accounts for their choosing this setting to pursue their profes- 
sional goals. The common ideals, principles, and commitments of 
that tradition should make this institution superbly effective in 
strengthening the moral, ethical, and professional foundations 
that compose the finest heritage of our profession. 
Because of our reliance on these common ideals, principles, 
and commitments, the new building being dedicated today 
should not be looked on as a place where we apply some unique 
formula for inculcating ethics and morality. I t  is, rather, a monu- 
ment to our determination that the fairness, decency, integrity, 
virtue, and love of truth taught a t  the hearthstones of thousands 
of homes throughout the land shall have a concentrated impact 
on the legal profession and the Nation's laws. I t  is in these homes, 
by God-fearing parents, that the young men and women who will 
be our graduates have already gained that intangible moral in- 
stinct that will bear its fruits in the legislative halls, the court- 
rooms, the offices, and other private and public places in the 
years to come. Thus, this consideration of our law school's special 
challenges and opportunities would be incomplete without some 
grateful acknowledgement for those homes, those fathers, and 
those mothers. They may well be the most important teachers our 
graduates will ever have. 
To illustrate what the law school could do with this unique 
resource, I will borrow and share with you an excerpt from a 
memorandum that Acting Dean Carl S. Hawkins circulated to 
the law faculty just a month ago inviting them to begin a process 
of defining "The Distinctive Qualities of the J. Reuben Clark Law 
School." That memorandum included the following proposals: 
1. We should be distinguished by the degree of our commit- 
ment to the development of our individual students, based upon 
our revealed knowledge as to the unique worth and dignity of 
each individual as a child of God. 
2. The Law School should be distinguished by its efforts to 
research, publish, and teach the Judeo-Christian value assump- 
tions underlying the development of our legal system. 
3. The Law School should be distinguished by its efforts to 
discover and articulate 
a. The ultimate spiritual values underlying our Con- 
stitutional system and how they may be adapted to dif- 
ferent cultures, 
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b. The ultimate spiritual values underlying our Com- 
mon Law legal system, and 
c. The moral and spiritual values underlying 
professional responsibility. 
4. The Law School should be distinguished by its efforts to 
research, publish, teach, and work for legal reform in support of 
family institutions. 
5. The Law School should be distinguished by its efforts to 
develop lawyering skills as tools to serve the needs of people in 
the light of their unique worth and dignity as spirit children of 
G O ~ . ~ O  
These are only illustrations, but sufficient to highlight the 
unique opportunities of and challenges to the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School. Whether or not there is an excess of law graduates 
now or in the future, the law, the legal profession, and this Nation 
have need of a law school such as this, and we are proud to 
introduce you to its faculty, its students, and this magnificent 
building. 
30. C. Hawkins, Memorandum to the Law School Faculty, July 23, 1975, at 4-5. 
